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Sami Outinen
FROM STEERING CAPITALISM TO SEEKING
MARKET ACCEPTANCE
Social Democrats and employment in Finland,
1975–1998
This article puts into a historical context the employment conceptions and policies of
leading Social Democrats in Finland from 1975 to 1998. It takes into account both the
strategic decision-making and public argumentation of the Social Democrats in employ-
ment-sensitive issues related to economic, employment, labour market, state company,
competition, globalization and integration policies.
Finland’s Social Democrats moved towards emphasizing private sector-led employment,
approached the middle classes, adopted monetarist ideas, accepted the ‘market economy’
and favoured ‘controlled restructuring’ over counter-cyclical measures in a series of steps in
1975–1998. The deregulation of financial markets meant a shifting of the basis of Social
Democratic employment policy from steering the capitalist economy to seeking market
acceptance of the party’s politics. This did not manage to guarantee full employment in
Finland during the period.
Furthermore, Finland’s Social Democrats seemed initially to practise a ‘third way’ type
of ‘Bad Sillanpää’ policy long before its adherents in the UK. such as Tony Blair. After
the mid-1970s, the Finnish Social Democrat-led governments no longer imitated Sweden,
while implementing many reforms which were followed by the Swedish Social Democrats.
Keywords Finland, social democracy, employment, economic policy, third
way, Nordic, globalization
Introduction
The aim of this article is to put into a historical context the employment conceptions
and policies of leading Social Democrats in Finland from 1975 to 1998. It concentrates
on the decision-making of the most influential political party in Finland at that time,
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the Social Democratic Party (SDP), and analyses how leading Social Democrats
conceptualized the transformation of Keynesian post-1945 welfare states with full
employment policies into unemployment-hit Schumpeterian post-national workfare
regimes from the mid-1970s onwards.1 This happened also in wage work-oriented
Nordic societies,2 such as Finland, where Social Democrats urged the maintenance or
achievement of full employment.3
Regulation theory distinguishes five interacting fundamental institutional forms in
capitalist societies. This cross-sectional framework enables us to sketch the most sig-
nificant dimensions of employment and analyse the employment-related policies (given in
brackets) of Finland’s Social Democrats as follows: the nature of the state (economic
employment and unemployment security policies); the wage-labour nexus (labour market
agreements); the monetary regime (national and global monetary regulation); the forms
of competition (state company, privatization and competition policy issues); and interna-
tional interaction, examples and parallels (European integration and economic globaliza-
tion, as well as the impact of Sweden and international organizations).4
The following empirical archival analysis reveals that the leading Finnish Social
Democrats considered that general economic policies, labour market policies and
transnational connections had a more important impact on employment than the
more narrowly defined ‘employment policy’ (public employment measures governed
by the Ministry of Labour), ‘unemployment security policy’ or the development of
public welfare services in 1975−1998. Globalizing financial markets gained a substan-
tial role in Social Democratic employment conceptions, whereas at the same time the
role of state companies was weakened in their opinion.
The dilemma of social democracy5 and unemployment has been explained by
weakening global economic growth,6 the rising of the middle classes7 and the increas-
ing attractiveness of neoliberalism also among Social Democrats.8 However, these
factors do not themselves explain why social democracy and its full employment policy
faced difficulties from the mid-1970s on. It is important also to analyse how Social
Democrats themselves have conceptualized these processes and practised policies which
have changed the premises of employment. Thus, the goal of this article is to research
how Social Democratic strategic decision-making and public argumentation on employ-
ment issues developed in Finland in 1975−1998.
An important aspect of this is the relation of Finnish Social Democrats’ own
employment-related ideas to the concepts of socialism, capitalism, markets and
neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is an established ideology which has been formulated
by, for example, Friedrich von Hayek from the 1930s onwards. Its breakthrough
occurred in the 1970s when Milton Friedman managed to motivate the feasibility of
neoliberal premises amidst an economic downturn in the West. It included in its
central features public service and social benefit retrenchments, labour market flex-
ibility, privatization, tight fiscal policy against budget deficits, tight monetary policy
against inflation and free exchange rates, as well as free movement of goods, services,
capital and labour within and across nations.9
Studying these factors enables us to observe new hybrids of thought between social
democracy, other ideologies and economic theories, as well as to analyse the continued
importance of Sweden as a (Nordic) model for Finland from the 1930s to the 1980s.10
Furthermore, the article analyses the relation of Finland’s Social Democrats to the
discussions on the crisis,11 direction,12 third ways13 and the future of social democracy.
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It initially seems that Finland belonged to the avant-garde of the Social Democratic
‘third-way policy’ compared to the Centre-Left policies of Bill Clinton’s democrats,
Tony Blair’s New Labour and Gerhard Schröder’s Social Democratic Party of
Germany (SPD) in the 1990s.
This article applies the methods of conceptual history. This means analysing how
research subjects themselves have interpreted and conceptualized the surrounding
reality,14 constructed social problems 15 and made reflexive comparisons,16 based on
their experiences and expectations.17 It means deconstructing the ways in which
leading Finnish Social Democrats sketched their alternative scopes of action in time
and distinguishing the struggles between the different conceptions of employment of
leading Social Democrats.
Thus, the article analyses what factors the leading Social Democrats themselves
perceived to be the most critical from the point of view of employment in Finland in
1975−1998 and how they themselves conceptualized the impact of globalization,
European integration, other political parties and business interests on their policies.
The primary aim of this article is to distinguish the major turns and conflict lines in
the employment-related decision-making and thought of leading Finnish Social
Democrats.
This means analysing Social Democratic employment-sensitive political processes
from agenda and goal setting via decision-making to the implementation of those
decisions. It enables one to analyse the interaction of ideas and action in decision-
making, and raises the question of whether Social Democratic programmes steered
their decision-making or vice versa. In this way it is also possible to observe what
strategic and structural factors explain the transformations in Social Democratic
conceptions of employment in Finland in 1975–1998.
The analysis is based on the discussions, decisions, programmes, declarations and
supplementary material of the SDP’s Party Conferences and Party Directorate. The
latter made all major decisions on the party’s policies between party conferences
usually organized triennially. The reading of the protocols of these bodies indicate that
the SDP’s position on employment-sensitive decisions of Finnish governments (the
SDP took part in Finnish coalition governments in 1975‒1998, except from 29
September 1976‒15 May 1977 and 26 April 1991‒13 April 1995) and the Bank
of Finland were usually decided or at least discussed in the weekly meetings of the
party’s Directorate. Social Democratic ministers and a representative of the influential
Central Organization of Finish Trade Unions (SAK) usually took part in its meetings.
The broader Party Council, which met a few times each year, was a leading body of
the SDP between Party Conferences, but its influence in the party’s daily politics was
secondary compared to the Party Directorate. Furthermore, the decision-making in the
Social Democratic Group in the SAK (the sole central organization of occupational
trade unions) will be analysed in this article. This group dealt with the SAK’s integral
labour market-related issues before these were formally decided upon together with
the Communists, the People’s Democrats and, from the 1990s onwards, the repre-
sentatives of the Left Alliance in the SAK’s official organizations.
Consequently, the major sources of this project are, first, the protocols of
Finland’s Social Democrats describing their strategic decision-making and, second,
the discussions in party congresses and programmes which may serve several functions
from the blueprints of action to strengthening inner-party cohesion and seeking voter
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or market acceptance.18 Thus, the most important archival sources for this article have
been the protocols of the discussions of the SDP’s governing bodies and the protocols
of the Social Democratic Group in the SAK.
This introduction will be followed by four chronological sections: ‘Bad Sillanpää’
presents Social Democratic middle class-oriented third way policy in Finland in
1975–1978. ‘Controlled Restructuring’ shows Social Democratic answers to the
challenges of industrial restructuring in Finland in the 1980s. ‘Seeking Market
Acceptance’ analyses how the reactions of market forces become a major factor in
Social Democratic employment issues in the 1990s. Finally, the last section draws
conclusions concerning the article as a whole.
Bad Sillanpää (1975–1978)
From the early 1960s, Finland developed into a modern Western welfare state as a
result of rapid structural change, changing from a primarily agrarian country into an
industrial and service-intensive economy. The Finnish economy was built around the
characteristics of economic growth, a strong export industry, wage work and rational
planning. The main tenets of Finnish welfare policy were earnings-related social
benefits, widening public services and collective labour market agreements built on a
highly unionized labour force from the late 1960s onwards. State-owned companies
played an important role in industrial production. Prices, wages, the movement of
capital, interest rates and rents were regulated by state authorities and thus, ulti-
mately, by the parliamentary political system, partly in collaboration with labour
market partners.19 The economic boom in the first half of the 1970s meant that the
Finnish economy recovered from the slower growth experienced in the late 1960s.20
The building of the Finnish welfare state was generated by the parliamentary
majority of the Left in the period 1958–196221 and a consensus between employers
and employees on the idea that skilled factory workers were the most important group
within the Finnish economy. Furthermore, the Left again gained a parliamentary
majority in 1966−1970 and formed, together with the Centre parties (Centre Party,
Liberal People’s Party and Swedish People’s Party of Finland), several influential
coalition governments in 1966−1975. In the same period, the division of both the
SDP and blue-collar trade union into two organizations (the SDP was organizationally
divided in 1959−1973 and the SAK in 1960−1969) ended, and a consensus-seeking
approach, which was also promoted by President Urho Kekkonen, strengthened in
Finnish society.22
Finnish economic growth deteriorated at the turn of 1974/1975. Prime Minister
and SDP party secretary Kalevi Sorsa argued in his party’s Directorate that the future
choices in economic and incomes policy (collective nation-wide agreements between
government, labour market parties and agricultural producers on terms and conditions
of employment, taxes, prices and social policy reforms) varied between ‘dark and
horrible’. He concluded that the negative trade balance was becoming the most
difficult problem for the Finnish economy, and both the unemployment rate and
inflation were predicted to rise.23
The SDP decided in early 1975 that its primary objective was to improve Finland’s
negative balance of payments (Protocol (P) 23.1.1975, SDP:n talouspoliittisen
työryhmän pöytäkirjoja liitteineen 1973–1975.24 Its representatives in the government
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supported the decision to strengthen fiscal policy.25 In the meeting of the party’s
Directorate, Prime Minister Sorsa said that his coalition government (SDP and Centre
parties) would allow a modest rise in unemployment as a necessary consequence of its
measures. Public service cuts were only criticized at the meeting by Jaakko Hyvönen (a
member of the Directorate) and Ulf Sundqvist (Minister of Education).26 Social
Democratic economic experts argued that the intensifying speculation against the
Finnish markka in the financial markets made it difficult to practise a counter-cyclical
economic policy.27 This meant that the SDP’s economic and employment policy
followed a capitalist rationality.
However, the Social Democrats still stressed that democratic socialism was the
ideological glue that held their programmes together at the SDP’s party congress in
Jyväskylä in the summer of 1975. According to the Declaration of Domestic Policy, their
long-term goal was a ‘socialist society’ and ‘equality between people’, which would be
achieved by seeking the support of the majority of citizens. Social Democrats declared
that ‘the central means of democratic economic planning’ were ‘the effective regula-
tion of capital movements, strong expansion of the production of state companies and
co-operatives, the directing of private firms, active employment and regional policy
and the regulation of foreign trade’. They also favoured industrial democracy,
endorsed ‘the societal control of commercial banks and insurance companies’ and
wanted to increase public services.28
Lasse Lehtinen argues that the above-mentioned programmes were meant to
win the support of the post-war baby boom generation, which had become partly
radicalized in the late 1960s.29 Paavo Lipponen, one of the architects of SDP’s
Declaration of Domestic Policy in the party office, writes in his memoirs that the
writers of the declaration wanted to stabilize the party’s identity around the
ideological fervour of the adherents of the party leader Rafael Paasio. Paasio had
unified the divided party in the 1960s but resigned from his post in 1975.30
However, some of the most radical Social Democrats, such as Liisa Jaakonsaari
from Oulu, understood the implementing of the content of the new programmes in
practice as a precondition of co-operating with bourgeoisie parties in future coali-
tion governments.31 This means that, ideologically, Finland’s Social Democrats
connected with Kautskyan social democracy, i.e. short-term reformism and a
long-term maturing of the socialist revolution. This was in line with their existing
Principal Programme, which was accepted back in 1952.32
Furthermore, SDP’s programmatic goal to promote state-driven rational economic
planning dates back to the original ideas of Rudolf Hilferding and Otto Bauer in
Germany and Austria in the 1920s.33 In Finland these ideas were developed, for
example, in the discussion of the so-called ‘O-group’ in 1955–1962. This group,
which included later influential Social Democratic politicians and economists such as
Mauno Koivisto, based its ideas on the logical empiricism of the Finnish philosopher
Eino Kaila .34
The rapid rise of unemployment led to the establishment of the so-called emer-
gency government in November 1975.35 The Centre-Left coalition government argued
strongly over the means to reduce unemployment. This meant that the Social
Democrats distanced themselves from both the Centre Party and the Communists
and found an agreement with business circles. In January 1976, the newly-elected SDP
leader Kalevi Sorsa and party secretary Ulf Sundqvist, together with a couple of
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ministers, decided to support the strategy formulated by the former director of the
Bank of Finland, Klaus Waris. This meant stabilizing the value of the currency (the
Finnish markka) with a strict budget and incomes policy. The aim was to curb inflation
and high unemployment had to be tolerated until the economy recovered.36
A central observation is that the SDP, now in opposition as a result of the
dissolution of the emergency government in September 1976,37 decided to transform
its practical short-term policy in early 1977. Party leader Sorsa argued that the SDP had
gathered ‘at Bad Sillanpää’ to transform its policy towards the favouring of export-
sector profitability and to distance itself from its socialist image due to seeking support
from the rising middle-class. This happened at the meeting of SDP’s Directorate on
25−26 January 1977.38 ‘Bad Sillanpää’ refers to West Germany’s Social Democrats’
Bad Godesberg programme in 1959. The meeting of the SDP’s Party Directorate was
arranged at Siuntio Spa, which was owned by the Miina Sillanpää Foundation. Thus,
Sorsa compared the meeting at ‘Bad Sillanpää’ to SPD’s Bad Godesberg Programme,
which was accepted at Bad [‘spa’ in English] Godesberg. Through that programme,
Germany’s Social Democrats disconnected themselves in principle from Kautskyan and
Marxian principles and transformed themselves into a party for all people in order to
improve their support.39
Sorsa and SAK’s chairman Pekka Oivio were committed to the ‘Bad Sillanpää
strategy’, which was created by the SDP’s Economic Expert Group. This group was
led by the former Social Democratic Finance Minister Paul Paavela and it consisted of
Social Democratic economists and civil servants of the Ministry of Finance.40 Paavela’s
group suggested decreasing company taxation, increasing productivity, improving the
export sector’s cost-competitiveness and practising strict financial and monetary
policy. This was meant to stabilize the economy and to concentrate on an anti-inflation
policy by keeping wage rises moderate and reducing income tax. The group justified
this by stating that Finland suffered from weak productivity, and a weak ability to both
introduce export products to markets and adapt to market conditions compared to
Sweden. According to Paavela’s group, the only means to increase employment during
the following year was to decrease production costs, even if it also suggested increasing
the loans from the State Investment Fund (a state-run institution which financed
investments in companies).41
The SDP’s Party Council accepted the main features of the Bad Sillanpää pro-
gramme of 9 March 1977;42 however, a minority of the members of the SDP’s
Directorate (Pentti Sahi from Jyväskylä and Pekka Sarkkinen from the party’s youth
organization) would still have preferred to revive the economy by increasing the public
debt. Sarkkinen and Jacob Söderman from the Finnish-Swedish Social Democrats also
argued for increased public sector jobs. This kind of Keynesian-oriented counter-
cyclical economic policy did not win enough support inside the SDP’s Council or
Directorate.43 Furthermore, Sahi and several Social Democrats in the SAK did not like
the fact that the Bad Sillanpää programme meant giving up policies that would see a
return to full employment immediately.44
The Bad Sillanpää programme became a political reality in Finland from the
summer of 1977 onwards. A new Centre-Left coalition government headed by the
Social Democratic party leader Kalevi Sorsa started to resuscitate the economy by
supporting private industry, promoting lower inflation, restricting the yearly
increase in the state budget and reducing the current balance of payments. Its
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goal was to lower the unemployment rate gradually to 2.5% by 1982, end the
increase of the state debt and, remarkably, keep the tax ceiling no higher than 40%
of the GDP.45
The new Finance Minister, Paul Paavela, managed to include the previously
mentioned main propositions of his Economic Expert Group into the government’s
programme. The only exception was that a tax ceiling was introduced by the Sorsa’s
government. However, tax reliefs for both workers and companies had been the
central object of Paavela’s group.
In the Korpilampi Congress on 5 September 1977, finance Minister Paul Paavela
presented the idea of the new politics by stressing the importance of guaranteeing
productive investments in order to stabilize the economy. Increasing income transfers
had not, according to Paavela, helped attain the goals of economic policy, Thus, there
were no good reasons to fund such transfers by taking on foreign debt, diminishing
public services or increasing taxes. According to Paavela, the tax ceiling was not the
problem, because of the ‘rather high level of welfare’ in Finland. Paavela framed the
future in such a way that ensuring a decent rate of growth (and thus the ability to fund
the welfare state) in the future meant that one had to guarantee the competitiveness of
the export sector. This, in turn, was only possible by keeping inflation below the level
of other countries. All these changes were connected to a more effective research and
innovation policy. He rejected the idea of ‘escaping to protectionism’ because it would
mean the lowering of the overall standard of living in Finland. Paavela thought that it
was too expensive and even futile to try to resuscitate the economy by increasing
public consumption. Private-sector production itself was the most effective vehicle to
maintain employment.46
Pirkko Työläjärvi (Minister of Social Affairs and Health), for her part, wanted to
invest in public services to avoid work-related migration to Sweden. She referred to
the Swedish model of higher wages, better social security and the implementing of
industrial democracy in her speech at Korpilampi. These ideas, however, remained in
the shadow of the Bad Sillanpää policy, even though Sulo Penttilä (Chair of the Finnish
Metalworkers’ Union) would have raised wages to the Swedish and Norwegian level to
increase productivity.47
All in all, the ‘Consensus of Korpilampi’ marketed the ideas of Bad Sillanpää to a
wider public. Paul Paavela compared the policies of Korpilampi to the decisions of the
SDP-led government in early 1975.48 The Centre-Left government maintained these
principles up to the end of its period in office in the spring of 1979.49 The connection
between Bad Sillanpää and the Consensus of Korpilampi has not been noticed in the
previous research, even if SDP’s business-friendly turn has been noted by Antti
Kujala50 and Jukka Tarkka.51 Pauli Kettunen52 and Juho Saari53 rightly connect the
Korpilampi conference to the government’s marketing of the company-driven resusci-
tation to the general public.
Thus, the transformation of Social Democratic policy in 1975–1978 could be
labelled the Bad Sillanpää policy. It meant, according to SDP’s leader Kalevi Sorsa, the
practising of a brand new Social Democratic policy in Finland. The SDP stressed more
than it had before the advantages of private production and wanted to curb unemploy-
ment by improving the export sector’s competitiveness over the long term.
Employment policy became more market-oriented than before in Finland, even if a
cyclical policy had always been weak in national54 and Social Democratic policy.55
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Controlled restructuring (1979–1990)
The concept of ‘controlled restructuring’ emerged for the first time in Social
Democratic discourse in the SDP’s parliamentary election programme in 1979.56 In
the following century, it became the means through which the SDP controlled
industrial restructuring. The Bad Sillanpää programme became, in a series of steps,
the main Social Democratic strategy for handling employment questions.
In May 1979, the new Social Democratic Prime Minister, Mauno Koivisto,
committed himself to the idea that taming inflation and increased competitiveness
was the primary way to improve employment,57 SDPdd, CA 80, TA). This also
required a tight fiscal policy. The SDP managed to prevent the suggestions of its
coalition government partners, the Centre Party and the People’s Democrats
(Communists), during the negotiations of the government’s programme, which
would have meant a substantial rise in the state’s expenditures. Its negotiators,
Koivisto, his assistant Seppo Lindblom, party leader Kalevi Sorsa, party secretary
Ulf Sundqvist and the Head of Planning at the SDP’s party office Paavo Lipponen, also
favoured the maintaining of a tax ceiling.58 This contributed to stopping an increase in
the relative size of the public sector.
Guaranteeing the export sector’s competitiveness by taming the costs of compa-
nies and the public sector was followed in the 1980s by SDP’s disengaging from the
spiral of inflation–devaluation.59 This idea became the core of the economic policy of
the following Centre-Left governments (1982−1983 and 1983−1987), which were led
by Sorsa after Koivisto was elected President in January 1982.60 The SDP-led
government’s controlled restructuring policy also meant a commitment to the con-
tinuation of the rationalization and automation of production along with shortening
working hours and easing retirement entry.61 Furthermore, the SDP actively urged
increasing public research and development (R&D) expenditures, which were meant to
reach ‘the Nordic level’.62 In 1982, Sorsa’s government committed itself to raising the
share of public R&D investments from 1.2% to 2.2% of the GDP over the following
10 years.63
The above-mentioned primary employment policy tools were supplemented by
the SDP’s active labour market policy. It meant public investments in occupational
education, temporary works and rehabilitation measures for the unemployed, as well
as promoting workers’ mobility in Finland in the early 1980s. Ulf Sundqvist presented
the Swedish active labour market policy as an example for Finland, while negotiating
the government’s programme in 1979.64 These Swedish ideas were adopted for the
first time in Finland after the mid-1960s.65 Part of the active labour market policy,
namely an employment subsidy for young people, called ‘youth societal guarantee’
(‘nuorten yhteiskuntatakuu’), was implemented in Finland in 1981.66 This followed the
Norwegian example, which was presented in Finland by the Central League of Social
Democratic Youth in 1976.67
The idea that salaried work was a basic component of Social Democratic thought was
partly challenged in the 1980s. André Gorz was a social philosopher whose concept of
‘liberation’ from work, instead of just easing or abolishing capitalist labour relations, was
supported by some of Finland’s Social Democrats. This happened when party members
reassessed the SDP’s Principal Programme in the 1980s.68 Gorz’s analysis was that the
Marxian theory that the proletariat would inevitably become a majority in society had not
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come true. This was because the working class had been transformed into a privileged
minority who could not govern the means of production. Thus, favouring the rationaliza-
tion of production was no longer in the interests of the working class.69
The majority of Finland’s Social Democrats felt, during the preparatory phase of
the party’s new Principal Programme, that the emerging ‘post-industrialism’ had to be
regulated by shortening working hours and regulating industrial development. This
would guarantee that in the future every worker could earn his/her living by working.
Only a minority of Social Democrats wanted to introduce a so-called citizen’s wage in
order to liberate people from the burden of salaried work;70 however, the SDP made
concessions to the post-material and individual values of the New Left and the 1960s
generation.71 It stressed in its renewed Principal Programme in 1987 that the SDP
represented not only waged workers but everyone who shared the party’s principles.
Accordingly, the SDP stated in the same spirit that ecological limits had to be taken
into account while improving the welfare of the people.72
The SDP’s Committee of Principal Programme, which sketched the party’s new
Principal Programme, separated the concepts of a ‘capitalist market economy’ and the
‘market’. The former was still opposed by the committee, whereas the latter was
conditionally accepted. The committee coined the notion of ‘market socialism’;73 this
implied the discontinuation of Social Democratic identity. The idea that the market
directed the economy was acknowledged in the new Principal Programme at the SDP’s
Party Conference in 1987. Furthermore, it urged that everyone’s right to work would
be guaranteed in the new programme.74
‘Controlled restructuring’, promoted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development,75 became a core concept of the so-called Blue-Red Coalition govern-
ment (its main parties were the conservative-liberal National Coalition Party and the SDP).
This meant promoting new, flexible and innovative production and re-educating as well as
relocating unemployed. This was intended to increase the competitiveness of export-
orientated companies. The government also urged a reduction of income taxation, and
committed itself to not increasing public expenditure more than the rise of growth and
productivity, and to increasing private funding of state companies;76 the Social Democrats
had already committed themselves to supporting the profitability of state companies in
1983.77 The guaranteeing of the continuity of a stable (anti-inflationist and non-devalua-
tion) economic policy was one of the reasons behind the shifting of the SDP’s main
government partner from the Centre Party to the National Coalition Party in 1987.78
The commitment to controlled restructuring did not manage to reduce the number of
unemployed to below 100,000 (Figure 1), despite the strong economic growth of the late
1980s (Figure 2). Even though the social expenditure to GDP ratio rose between 1982 and
1986 from 22.5% to 25.5%, the public expenditure to GDP ratio was still 42% in Finland
in 1989.79 Finnish public services expanded in the 1980s;80 however, this was more a
consequence of high economic growth in European comparison and the building of national
primary school, health centre and day care networks (this was agreed before the mid-
1970s)81 than from strongly social democratic-oriented economic policy of Finnish govern-
ments from Bad Sillanpää onwards.
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Seeking market acceptance (1991–1998)
Social Democratic ideas about employment were heavily influenced by the liberal-
ization of financial markets. The power of capital increased in Finland, especially
after the Bank of Finland decided to dissolve the regulation of interest rates in August
1986. The immediate reason for this decision was to avoid a devaluation of the
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Finnish markka. The representatives of large commercial banks promised to transfer
capital back to Finland after this decision.84 This guaranteed the continuation of the
Social Democratic anti-deflationary monetary policy; however, the price to be paid
for limiting the state’s regulation of the economy was enormous.
In the 1980s, Social Democrats argued over whether the liberalization of capitalist
regulation was favourable or not. Some of them (such as members of the Party
Directorate Matti Puhakka and Jarmo Rantanen and a participant of the Party
Conference Jukka Gustafsson from Tampere) feared that freeing capital flows meant
weakening productive investments and thus the basic condition for employment. The
increase of speculative investments was seen to weaken opportunities to direct the
economy and practise economic planning. Trade and Industry Minister Seppo
Lindblom, on the other hand, believed that ‘the grey monetary market’ only had a
favourable impact on the real economy and investment decisions.85 Furthermore, the
SDP’s Working Group for Employment Policy stressed that the removal of capital
controls required counter measures such as increasing public R&D investments, risk
capital and investment in education.86
Leading Social Democrats understood the heavy impact of the dissolution of the
interest rate cartel on Finnish economic policy. This decision was agreed upon in the
private meeting between the Chairman of the Central Bank, Rolf Kullberg, Prime
Minister Kalevi Sorsa and Finance Minister Esko Ollila (Centre Party) in the summer
of 1986.87 Sorsa stated in the SDP’s Party Directorate that this measure was seen to be
necessary and Social Democrats should adapt themselves to its consequences.88
It was clear to Social Democratic decision-makers that the dissolution of the
interest rate cartel would mean higher interest rates during economic downturns
(Governor of the Central Bank Erkki Liikanen),89 a more moderate labour market
policy (Seppo Lindblom), unwelcome surprises (Sorsa), a company-friendly budgetary
policy (Social Democratic economist and a civil servant in the Ministry of Finance,
Raimo Sailas) and the need to give the impression that budgetary measures supported
financial stability (Sailas).90 Social Democratic members of parliament Jukka
Gustafsson and Liisa Jaakonsaari wanted to add a sentence about the increasing
monitoring and directing of finance capital to the programme of the Blue-Red
Government in the spring of 1987. They did not, however, get enough support for
this measure in the meeting of the party’s Directorate.91
Thus, leading Social Democrats were not active proponents of the liberation of
capital flows, but they adapted to the substantial increase in the power of the market
and the reduction in the ability to engage in economic planning. This meant that Social
Democrats accepted that the market’s reactions should be taken into account before
making important economic and employment policy decisions and that those decisions
should be justified in a way that satisfied market forces.
This process was part of the transformation of Western economic regulation from
its post-war mixed economy, low interest rate policy and the promotion of productive
investments to ensure low inflation, positive real interest rates and stable currencies.
This meant weakening the premises of a counter-cyclical economic policy and harsh
capital competition between different geographical entities.92
According to Ashley Lavelle, the acceptance of the hegemony of capital was the
price that reformist social democracy paid to guarantee steady economic growth after
this growth was weakened in the 1970s.93 From this point of view, it is interesting that
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Finland’s Social Democrats were also committed to the liberalization of financial
markets despite decent economic growth in the 1980s. Thus, the increasing power
of capital is a better explanation of the reasons behind positive Social Democratic
attitudes towards capital from the 1970s onwards.
Finland followed the Swedish example of liberating capital markets.94 Leading
Swedish Social Democratic economists had thought, before the parliamentary
elections of 1982, that the expansion of the public sector as a percentage of the
GDP must be stopped and that the new reforms must be funded either by other
budget cuts or by economic growth in the new era of globalization. Thus, the new
Social Democratic government followed the new ‘Third Road’ policy, located
between the Swedish interpretation of Keynesianism and the Neoliberal austerity
policy after entering office in Sweden in 1982. It funded the new reforms by budget
cuts, decided to deregulate the financial markets in 1985–1986, urged all state
enterprises to make profits, partly privatized some state enterprises, devalued the
crown by 16% to improve the competitiveness of the export sector and persuaded
the unions to agree to wage restraint. This meant increasing capital profits relative
to wages.95
However, Finland’s Social Democrat-led governments had already implemented
many reforms that resembled the premises of the Swedish Social Democrats’ Third
Way Programme in the 1980s. This meant that Finland did not just follow the Swedish
example after the mid-1970s. Bad Sillanpää and ‘Controlled Restructuring’ consisted
of many features that were adopted in Sweden in the 1980s.
Furthermore, it initially seems that Finland belonged to the avant-garde of the
Social Democratic ‘third-way policy’ compared to the Centre-Left policies of Bill
Clinton’s democrats, Tony Blair’s New Labour, and Gerhard Schröder’s SPD in the
1990s.96 It is remarkable that this happened long before the collapse of the east
European Communist bloc. Thus, the end of the Cold War and its consequences do
not explain the market friendliness of Nordic Social Democrats, despite the euphoric
pro-market statements of a few of Finland’s leading Social Democrats (Finance
Minister Erkki Liikanen and Member of the Party Directorate Paavo Lipponen) in
the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1990.97
Unlike Sweden, Finland also joined the European Monetary Union (EMU) in
1999. Finland’s Social Democrats favoured the decision.98 The trade unions had also
accepted this, especially after guaranteeing the continuation of the Finnish labour
market model. This meant that branch-level labour market agreements were usually
generally binding, even though not all employers were organized in employers’
associations. Another important mechanism in this respect was the creating of buffer
funds in the unemployment security and pension systems in order to ease the worst
cyclical problems in the asymmetric currency area.99
Social Democrats initially wanted employment criteria added to the EMU’s
rules,100 but this demand was ‘forgotten’ after the high unemployment rate in
EMU-country comparison threatened to hinder Finland joining the EMU in the first
phase in 1999. This was because it was estimated that Finland’s unemployment rate
would have been higher than the planned EMU criteria would have permitted.101
The SDP motivated its positive attitude to the EMU by, for example, guaranteeing
the continuity of its own and the Finnish economic policy. This was based on according
to the SDP’s EMU declaration on a balanced and stable economy, a low inflation and
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anti-devaluation policy which promoted low interest rates, private investments and
increasing employment.102 Social Democratic EMU opponents did not believe that the
European Union (EU) had enough resources to tame unemployment in the structurally
asymmetric EMU area. This argument of the Vice-Chairman of SDP’s Parliamentary
Group, Erkki Tuomioja, was also used by members of the Party Directorate – Osku
Pajamäki from Helsinki and Ulla Juurola from Lahti – in the Directorate’s
discussions.103
Finland’s Social Democrats, together with their Nordic colleagues, supported the
idea that the EU should practise a more effective employment policy. Low inflation
measures, an active labour market policy and coordinated demand management were
the cornerstones of the declaration of the Joint Committee of the Nordic Social
Democratic Labour Movement (SAMAK) in 1997.103,104 Nordic Social Democrats
had supported a Keynesian economic policy in the SAMAK meeting in 1976.105 Prime
Minister Kalevi Sorsa had demanded European coordination of Neo-Keynesian eco-
nomic policy in his proposition to European Social Democratic leaders in the spring of
1983. This idea was nullified after the French socialists made a U-turn in their policy,
moving from socialism to neoliberalism.106
The French government had failed to implement successfully a reflationary and
counter-cyclical economic policy, which involved, for example, a reduction of working
hours, increasing wages, improving social security, hiring more people in the public
sector, increasing company taxation and nationalizing private banks and companies.
Capital flight had taught nation-states, including those with Left-wing governments,
that in an open world economy their freedom to act was restricted, capital-friendly
politics was an economic necessity and capital was firmly in power.107
Finland’s Social Democrats supported Keynesian employment measures in the
international context. Furthermore, the Social Democratic supporters of Finland’s
membership of the EU (Finland joined the EU on 1 January 1994) favoured the
EU’s free movement of goods, services, labour and capital. They stated that EU
membership was in the interests of the all-important export sector and counter-
balanced the power of free-flowing financial capital.108
Thus, Social Democratic market-friendly third way policies seemed to be rational
national answers to the challenges of the globalizing economy. They were framed in a
way that the maintaining of the competitiveness of national companies also promoted
employment nationally. At the same time, the European co-operation between Social
Democrats in practising international counter-cyclical economic policies and regulating
capital flows in the EU was not strong enough to overcome the primarily national
focus in employment-related policies until the end of the 20th century.
The Social Democratic market-acceptance strategy was formulated during the
party’s period in opposition, which was an era of deep depression in Finland in
1991–1995. The SDP favoured selected measures to revive the economy under the
leadership of Ulf Sundqvist in 1992. This meant prioritizing productive public sector
investment and trusting in market forces and lower interest rates. These policies were
supposed to endorse, for example, public sector productivity and economic competi-
tion, and to require the selling of state companies and public sector retrenchments in
order to balance the public finances after the recovery of the economy.109
Public sector retrenchments were accepted by the majority of Social Democrats
after the Finnish economy began to recover in 1994. A new party leader, Paavo
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Lipponen, stressed that the power of the market could only be tamed by decreasing
high foreign indebtedness. He stated that the rising share of public expenditures
compared to the GDP threatened the premises of economic growth and thus endan-
gered the rise of employment. Other objectives behind Lipponen’s SDP policy were
lowering inflation, balancing the current balance of payments and cutting public
expenditures.110 As Paavo Lipponen made clear in a public speech in September
1994, Kjell-Olof Feldt, Social Democratic Minister of Finance behind Sweden’s third
way policy in the 1980s, was one of his role models.111
The so-called ‘rainbow government’ (SDP, National Coalition Party, the Left
Alliance, the Greens and the Swedish People’s Party) aimed at halving the number of
those unemployed by adopting the previously mentioned major Social Democratic
goals, which were accepted by the party’s Council.112
Furthermore, the SAK underlined a new strategy which involved commitment to
the low inflation goal of the Bank of Finland and allowing labour costs to rise no more
than those found in countries that were Finland’s closest economic competitors. This
replaced the SAK’s previous goal of keeping the relationship between wages and income
from capital incomes intact. The SAK motivated its new strategy by interpreting that
Finland’s EU membership and market-bound interest rates were the reasons why it had
to commit permanently to low inflation policy.113
Bob Jessop and Ngai-Ling Sum distinguish four different transition strategies from
Keynesian national welfare states to Schumpeterian post-national workfare regimes. Those
strategies can all be applied in part at the same time within one state and, indeed, have been
used in the European Union. They were neoliberal, neocoporatist, neostatist and neocom-
munitarian strategies. In 1975–1998, Finnish Social Democrats seemed to adopt parts of at
least three of these strategies.114 This meant adopting neoliberal-oriented measures such as
financial market deregulation and public sector retrenchment. Neocorporatist innovativeness
and restructuring strategies were also influential among the SDP as well as neostatist public
R&D investments.
Gerassimos Moschonas stresses that the EMU was one reason behind the Social
Democratic neoliberal turn in Europe in the 1990s. He argues that the Social
Democratic neoliberal orientation stemmed back to the 1980s.115 This was, however,
only partly true, as the Social Democratic commitment to free capital flows in, for
example, Finland and Sweden dated back to the 1980s. This mainly explains the logic
of the market-acceptance policy, which was consolidated by fulfilling the EMU criteria.
The deregulation of financial markets meant shifting the basis of Social Democratic
employment policy from steering the capitalist economy to seeking market acceptance
of the party’s policies. The taming of inflation and wage increases were seen as
necessary requirements for keeping interest rates low and markets stable. These,
again, were seen as necessary measures in order to generate investments and improve
employability. The market-acceptance strategy, however, did not succeed in reducing
Finnish unemployment substantially in the 1990s (Figure 1), consequently weakening
the position of the unemployed.
Conclusions
The mobilization of a political and occupational labour movement has been heavily
linked with the birth and fortunes of social democracy. The interests of salaried
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workers and a primary emphasis on providing and securing work have been core
questions for the Social Democrats. Thus, the birth of mass unemployment, a
globalizing economy, structural changes towards a service society and innovative-
ness-centred industrial restructuring have severely challenged the ideas and practices
of social democracy after more favourable developments in the decades immediately
after the Second World War.
Finnish Social Democrats moved towards emphasizing private sector-led employment,
approached the middle classes, accepted the ‘market economy’ and favoured ‘controlled
restructuring’ over counter-cyclical measures in a series of steps in 1975–1998. Export
sector competitiveness in global markets, European integration and R&D investment were
the cornerstones of Social Democratic employment policy in Finland at the time. This can
be explained by a central role of export industries and thus global competitiveness, as well
as technology policy in SDP’s employment-related conceptions.
Finnish Social Democrats seemed initially to practise a ‘third way’ type of ‘Bad
Sillanpää’ policy long before adherents such as Tony Blair in the UK. After the mid-
1970s, Finnish Social Democrat-led governments no longer imitated Sweden and
implemented many reforms, which were followed by the Swedish Social Democrats’
Third Way Programme in the 1980s. However, the SDP tried to implement interna-
tional Keynesianism on many occasions in international organizations in 1975–1998.
Stabilizing the economy, increasing competitiveness and moderating wage
demands became positive measures for Finnish Social Democrats in 1975–1998.
These ideas were based on the policies of ‘Bad Sillanpää’ after the mid-1970s,
‘controlled restructuring’ in the 1980s and ‘seeking market acceptance’ in the
1990s. Keynesian counter-cyclical economic policy also remained in the shadow of
Social Democratic policy in the last decades of the 20th century. The Red-Green values
of the New Left were rarely found among Finnish Social Democrats at this time.
The compromise between support by Social Democratic ministers for the idea of
sound state finances and moderate but real wage increases for Social Democratic trade
union members usually trumped the interests of the public sector in Social Democratic
inner-party decision-making. Accordingly, a stable economic policy was favoured amongst
Finnish Social Democrats. These ideas were also partly acceptable for the SDP’s coalition
partners and employers’ organizations in Finland. Even if the SDP was the most powerful
party in the coalition governments, at least in 1977−1987 and 1995−1998, the Left did not
possess a parliamentary majority and employers’ powers increased due to globalization and
the flexibilization of production in a series of steps in 1975–1998.
The primary Social Democratic concept regarding employment in Finland in
1975–1998 was that economic growth should be carried forward by an economic
and incomes policy that supported the competitiveness of the export sector. This
meant stabilizing the economy by abolishing the deficit of the current balance of
payments, fighting against an inflation–devaluation spiral and stopping the state from
running into debt by lowering interest rates. It was expected that these policies would
bring new private sector investment and increasing employment in the long term,
especially after the liberalizing of the financial market from the 1980s onwards. This
led to the transformation of the Social Democratic concept of employment from
steering capitalism to seeking market acceptance.
The Social Democratic ideal of full employment had paradoxically required a
stronger role for the state sector in providing employment at the very same time that
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economic circumstances became more market-driven. Thus, the weakening of economic
growth itself does not explain the crisis of social democracy. The same is true regarding
the rise of the middle classes as a reason behind the crisis of social democracy.
On the contrary, the introduction of middle-class-oriented third way policies
did not manage to hinder the marginalization of a substantial part of waged
workers, which weakened SDP’s popularity. Furthermore, leading Finnish Social
Democrats did not openly refer to neoliberal ideologists even if their employment-
related ideas and policies became partly neoliberal-oriented during the last decades
of the 20th century.
The primacy of work remained the central concept of Social Democratic thought
in Finland at the same time. However, the Social Democrats did not manage to drop
the number of unemployed below 100,000 (around 4% of the workforce) in Finland
after 1975. This is a significant reason for the crisis of social democracy. Thus, whether
mass unemployment stemmed from heavily Social Democratic-driven national employ-
ment-sensitive policies, Social Democratic employment policy strategy, the power of
other parties, the interests of employers or the functioning of globalizing capitalism is a
secondary question when analysing the fortunes of social democracy.
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